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Violative of Fourth Amendment
Acting upon information that petition-
er was using a leasehold as a personal
residence in violation of the building's
occupancy permit, a San Francisco De-
partment of Public Health inspector
confronted petitioner and demanded
that he permit an inspection of the
premises. Petitioner refused on the
ground that the inspector did not have
a search warrant and was subsequently
charged with a violation of the Housing
Code, for failing to permit a warrantless
inspection. Petitioner then applied for
a writ of prohibition, in order to pre-
vent the criminal prosecution, but the
California courts denied relief. In a com-
panion case, the owner of a locked
warehouse refused to allow an inspec-
tion by a representative of the Seattle
Fire Department acting without a search
warrant, and was then convicted of
violating the city Fire Code.
The United States Supreme Court re-
versed both judgments and held that
administrative investigations of private
and commercial premises are significant
intrusions upon the interests protected
by the fourth amendment and, there-
fore, except under emergency conditions,
may not be conducted without search
warrants. Camara v. Municipal Court of
San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967);
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967).
While the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibits un-
reasonable searches and seizures,' not
all, but only unreasonable searches, are
prohibited; and what is "reasonable" or
"unreasonable" is a factual determina-
tion to be made in each case. 2 Differing
standards have been devised by the
courts depending upon whether the ob-
ject of the search is the procurement of
'The amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be search-
ed, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63
(1950).
evidence to be used in a criminal prose-
cution or the enforcement of an admini-
strative code. 3
It is well settled that a warrantless
search for evidence of a crime, with
certain limited exceptions,4  is prima
facie unreasonable in both the state and
federal courts.' The protection provided
by the fourth amendment in criminal
cases extends to businesses as well as
private individuals. 6
:'Stahl & Kuhn, Inspections and the Fourth
Amendment, 11 U. PITT. L. REV. 256, 262
(1950).
4The exceptions are: (1) A search that is in-
cident to a valid arrest, Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); (2) The search
of a vehicle in transit, Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); (3) Emergency
conditions present, such as a national emer-
gency, Shinyu Noro v. United States, 148
F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1945), or the imminent
danger of the destruction of the evidence,
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15
(1948) (dictum).
'E.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451, 454 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
There must be "probable cause" for the
issuance of a warrant. U.S. CONsT. amend.
IV. "Probable cause" has been said to exist
when
the facts and circumstances within
[the officer's] knowledge and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information
were sufficient in themselves to warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the be-
lief [that an offense is being committed]
... . Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 162 (1925).
Silverthorne Lumber -Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920). In Silverthorne, it was held
that the seizure of a corporation's books by
the United States Marshal, without authority,
and for the purpose of a criminal prosecution,
was an illegal search and seizure although the
books could have been subpoenaed. The Court
said "the rights of a corporation against un-
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In contrast, a search warrant has
traditionally not been required where the
search was employed to carry out an
administrative function. It was early es-
tablished that a business could riot refuse
to permit examination of its books by
tax officials I and it soon became accepted
procedure for administrative officials to
inspect businesses without a warrant. 8
Thus, over the years, warrantless inspec-
tions have been permitted of private
businesses, as well as businesses open to
the public.9
There have been two basic reasons
advanced for this permissiveness. Some
courts have upheld the investigations be-
cause of the "implied consent" to the
intrusion by the owner of a business
which is either public" or operating
under a license." However, the most
lawful search and seizure are to be protected
even if the same result might have been
achieved in a lawful way." Id. at 392.
7In re Stouse, 23 F. Cas. 261 (No. 13,548)
(D. Nev. 1871). The court held that the
proceeding was civil in nature and that the
fourth amendment applied only to criminal
cases.
8 E.g., Hubbell v. Higgens, 148 Iowa 36, 126
N.W. 914 (1910), wherein it was held that
such an inspection by an official hotel inspector
pursuant to a state law violated no constitutional
right.
' See, e.g., United States v. Crescent-Kelvan Co.,
164 F.2d 582, 586 (3d Cir. 1948) (drug man-
ufacturer-private); State v. Nolan, 161 Tenn.
293, 30 S.W.2d 601 (1930) (barbershop-
public).
"0 Reinhart v. State, 193 Tenn. 15, 241 S.W.2d
854 (1951).
"Commonwealth v. Abell, 275 Ky. 802, 122
S.W.2d 757 (1939); Silber v. Bloodgood, 177
Wis. 608, 188 N.W. 84 (1922), wherein the
court stated:
No reason is perceived why the Legislature,
as a condition for granting permission to
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widespread justification for the procedure
has been that these investigations are
civil in nature and are conducted under
the police power of the state for the
health and safety of the public. They are,
therefore, not unreasonable searches in
the constitutional sense.' 2 For example,
in Sajee v. City of Buffalo," the court
refused to enjoin enforcement of an ordi-
nance regulating the sale of soft drinks
which allowed city health officials to
inspect all refreshment businesses in
order to determine if the health laws were
being complied with. It was decided that
search and seizure protection "has no
application to reasonable rules and regu-




Nor was a search warrant required by
the federal courts in dealing with federal
administrative agencies. 1" In Peeples v.
United States,'0 agents of the Internal
conduct a business which it may prohibit,
may not require the licensee to submit his
premises to an inspection by the lawful
authorities, without the issuance of a
search warrant. id. at 611, 188 N.W.
at 85.
12City of St. Louis v. Evans, 337 S.W.2d
948 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1960); Dederick v. Smith,
88 N.H. 63, 184 A. 595, appeal dismissed,
299 U.S. 506 (1936).
1" 204 App. Div. 561, 198 N.Y.S. 646 (4th
Dep't 1923).
'4 Id. at 565-66, 198 N.Y.S. at 651. (The
section under which this case was decided,
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 8, is almost identical
to the fourth amendment.)
'9See, e.g., 52 Stat. 1057 (1938), 21 U.S.C,
§374 (a) (1964) which permits agents of the
Food and Drug Administration to inspect, at
reasonable times, any establishment in which
food and drugs are handled.
11;341 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 988 (1965).
Revenue Service had entered the defen-
dant's premises to determine if he had
been carrying on his liquor business
without a federal tax stamp. In uphold-
ing the statute which authorized the in-
spections,17 the court stated:
There is no question but that Congress in
the legitimate exercise of its authority
has the right to provide for the keeping
and inspection of records and to allow
federal agents to enter premises on which
a regulated business is being conducted,
for the purpose of insuring compliance
with the legal requirements."'
Apparently, the constitutionally ground-
ed limitations on administrative searches
were that the acts of the officials be
authorized by a valid statute, that they
be conducted during reasonable hours,
and that the search have some relation
to the regulation sought to be enforced.' 9
Although the practice of warrantless
searches of businesses by administrative
officials has been uniformly sanctioned
by both state and federal courts, the law
concerning such searches of private prem-
ises saw a different development. Here,
warrantless searches could not be justi-
fied on the basis of an implied consent
of the owner, i.e., the premises are not
open to the public and there is no lic-
ense required. If such investigations
1772 Stat. 1348 (1958), 26 U.S.C. §5146(b)
(1964).
Is 341 F.2d at 64. See also A. CORNELIUS, THE
LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 25 (lst ed.
1926).
"Comment, Administrative Searches and the
Fourth Amendment, 30 Mo. L. REV. 612, 616-
17 (1965). (Additional requirements were that
the search have definite bounds and that the
search may not be used for the enforcement of
the criminal law.)
could be upheld, they had to find shelter
within the police power of the state,
while recognizing the distinction between
a civil and criminal search.20
The first case to consider the problem
was District of Columbia v. Little.2' Act-
ing upon a complaint that unsanitary
conditions existed on defendant's prem-
ises, an inspector of the Health Depart-
ment attempted a warrantless search of
defendant's home. He informed defendant
of the purpose of his visit but she re-
fused to unlock her door, and was sub-
sequently charged with obstructing an
inspector in the performance of his duty.
The court, in finding for the defendant,
held that a government official could not
invade a private home unless (1) a
magistrate has authorized the search,
or (2) emergency conditions afford no
time to apply to a magistrate for a war-
rant.22 The court rejected the prosecution's
argument that the fourth amendment ap-
plies only to criminal searches, 23 and re-
fused to be swayed by the fact that the
procedure for obtaining warrants in the
District of Columbia was not available
for the enforcement of health laws.24 The
dissent argued that the fourth amendment
was intended to apply solely to criminal
and quasi-criminal proceedings, and,
further, that the sanctity of the home is
not absolute but subject to qualifications,
one of them being the right of inspection
in the interests of public health and safe-
2)Id. at 619.
21 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), afi'd on other
grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
22d. at 17.
' Id. at 16-17.
2- Id. at 20.
13 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1967
ty.22 On appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court, the constitutional issue was
not reached.2 1
'
It cannot be said that the Little ration-
ale found any wide acceptance. State de-
cisions subsequently expressed the opinion
that when the interests of the individual
were balanced against the public need for
inspection, the public must prevail.
Therefore, these decisions refused to hold
an inspection unreasonable simply because
no warrant was obtained.2 7 One court,
drawing upon the precedents dealing with
the investigation of businesses, stated that
until the Little case
[i]t seems to have been taken for granted
throughout the United States that in-
spections of buildings, including dwellings,
under reasonable regulations did not con-
stitute 'unreasonable search and seizure' in
the constitutional sense. ... .2
In Frank v. Maryland,2 9 the Supreme
Court directly confronted the issue of
warrantless searches of private dwellings
by administrative officials. A Baltimore
251d. at 25 (dissenting opinion).
20in District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S.
1 (1950), the case was ultimately decided on
the ground that defendant's acts did not con-
stitute unlawful interference with the officer's
duty. The dissent, however, did express the
opinion that the inspection did not violate the
fourth amendment since it was of a reasonable
nature and in protection of the public health.
Id. at 7-8.
27 E.g., Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d
764 (1956); State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 168
Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958), aft'd,
364 U.S. 263 (1960).
S State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio St.
123, 151 N.E.2d 523, 528 (1958), aft'd, 364
U.S. 263 (1960). The court, in a unanimous
opinion, chose to follow the reasoning of the
Little dissent.
2!9 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
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city health inspector found evidence of
rat infestation outside of defendant's
house. The inspector explained his pres-
ence to the defendant and asked for
permission to inspect the basement with-
out a warrant, but the defendant refused
and was convicted of violating a section
of the city code which prohibited the
owner or occupant of a house from re-
fusing such inspections by health offi-
cials. The Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction by a bare majority. Although
recognizing that the protection against
unreasonable search and seizure is ap-
plicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter stated that under these circum-
stances the protection could not be in-
voked. He pointed out that the power
of inspection in this case was strictly
limited, i.e., inspection could only be
made in the daytime, upon probable
cause to suspect that a nuisance exists,
and without forceable entry by the in-
spector. In addition, the system of in-
spection here had been in existence for
more than a century and a half, and the
need for enforcement of minimum health
standards had increased over the years.
He therefore concluded that the investi-
gation was reasonable. While the fourth
amendment does apply to this type of
search, it was reasoned that the safe-
guards of the amendment could not be
applied with the same force as in the
criminal area, since the power to inspect
"would be greatly hobbled" by such a
strict application. Furthermore, Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter believed that a warrant
issued for administrative investigations
would be nothing more than a "syn-
thetic search warrant" in order to permit
periodic inspections."
Speaking for the four dissenting Jus-
tices, Mr. Justice Douglas placed greater
emphasis on the individual's right of pri-
vacy. He maintained that the fourth
amendment applies with equal force to
administrative as well as criminal in-
vestigations. He further noted that these
administrative investigations can lead to
criminal prosecutions and so should not
receive secondary consideration in ap-
plying fourth amendment standards. All
officers tend to be officious, he said, and
health inspectors making out a case for
a criminal prosecution are no exception.
He did, however, note that the test for
probable cause would be different in
this area, and that the general submission
of the public to these investigations in-
dicates that a warrant procedure would
not endanger the health programA1
The Frank case represented the law in
this area until the recent cases of Cam-
ara v. Municipal Court of San Francis-
co .12 and See v. City of Seattle. 3 In these
30 Id. at 373. Subsequent to the Frank case,
the Court decided Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price,
364 U.S. 263 (1960) which was factually simi-
lar to Frank. The state court's decision was
affirmed by an equally divided vote. State
court cases subsequent to Frank include: State
v. Rees, 139 N.W.2d 406 (Iowa 1966); Com-
monwealth v. Hadly, 222 N.E.2d 681 (Mass.
1966); but see People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d
304, 200 N.E.2d 441, 251 N.Y.S.2d 452
(1964). For a discussion of the latter case
see II CATHOLIC LAW. 150 (1965).
:I1d. at 383-84 (dissenting opinion). For a
discussion of this case, see Comment, Adininis-
trative Inspections and the Fourth Amendment
-A Rationale, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 288 (1965).
3? 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
:;3387 U.S. 541 (1967).
two cases, the question of the propriety
of warrantless inspections was, once
again, squarely before the Court. The
Court, in Camara, concluded that Frank,
to the extent that it sanctions such war-
rantless searches, must be overruled. The
notion that the fourth amendment does
not apply with equal force to administra-
tive as well as criminal searches was
rejected. Even if such a premise were
accepted, the Court noted that the fourth
amendment would nonetheless apply,
since fire, health and housing codes
are enforced by criminal processes and,
as in this case, refusal to permit an in-
spection is itself a crime. 34 To the argu-
ment that the statute authorizing the
inspection was "hedged with safeguards,"
thus making the search reasonable, the
Court answered that the occupant still
had no way of knowing whether the in-
spector had proper authorization for his
search or what the lawful limits of the
search would be; furthermore, the only
way he could find out would be by risk-
ing criminal prosecution. Thus,
[t]he practical effect of [the inspection
system] is to leave the occupant subject
to the discretion of the official in the
field. This is precisely the discretion to
invade private property which we have
consistently circumscribed by a require-
34 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. HOUSING CODE § 503
gives employees of the city departments the
authority to enter any building, at reasonable
times and after proper credentials are presented,
in the performance of their duty under the
Municipal Code. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. HOUS-
ING CODE § 507 provides that anyone who re-
sists or opposes the execution of any of the
provisions of the Code shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
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ment that a disinterested party warrant
the need to search. 3
Furthermore, the Court could see no
reason why inspection programs could not
achieve the goal of elimination of con-
ditions hazardous to the public within the
framework of a warrant procedure. To
allow the attainment of these goals
through periodic inspections, new stan-
dards of "probable cause" for an in-
spection warrant were described. "Prob-
able cause," said the Court, "may be
based upon the passage of time, the na-
ture of the building (e.g., a multi-family
apartment house), or the condition of the
entire area" but not necessarily on any
knowledge of conditions in a particular
dwelling." The Court further added that
this opinion was not intended to foreclose
inspections held in emergency situations.
In the companion case, '7 a routine,
periodic, warrantless inspection of a
commercial structure not open to the
public was involved. The Court stated
emphatically, however, that "the principles
enunciated in the Camara opinion [are]
applicable here. ,,:Is Pointing out
that the fourth amendment has been ap-
plied to businesses as well as to indi-
viduals in criminal prosecutions, the
Court found no reason for relaxing the
safeguards of search and seizure in the
administrative area. The Court drew up-
on the practice of subpoena of corporate
books by an administrative agency,
which must be limited in scope and rele-
vant in purpose, as demonstrating that
35 387 U.S. at 532-33.
3,ld. at 538.
.3 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
381d. at 542.
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constitutional limits are required in the
area of actual intrusion upon business
property.
The dissent believed that the two
opinions seriously jeopardized enforce-
ment of health codes by encouraging the
individual to refuse entry. It was argued
that the occupant need not be subjected
to the whim of the official since once
the inspectors identify themselves, the
occupant can simply call up the inspect-
or's superior and resolve any doubts
about authorization. Moreover, strenuous
objection was lodged against the relaxed
standards of "probable cause" which
would lead to "warrants issued by the
rubber stamp of a willing magistrate."' 31'
These warrants could only lead to un-
necessary paperwork and, worse, to a
degradation of the search warrant and
the magistrate issuing them.
These decisions will, no doubt, create
many constitutional and administrative
problems. The administrative agencies
are faced with the choice of allowing
search warrants to be sought only after a
refusal to allow the inspection or to
allow their agents to seek an area war-
rant before the inspection begins. As a
practical matter, however, since there
are few refusals of inspection, ' 0 an in-
spector will be most likely to seek a war-
rant only after he is denied entry. Then,
armed with the administrative agency's
authorization to inspect the entire area,
he could go to a magistrate and establish
"probable cause" for the particular prem-
'1387 U.S. at 547-48 (dissenting opinion).
4, Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383-84
(1959) (dissenting opinion).
ises by establishing that potential viola-
tions exist in the area. The magistrate
would be unable to question the policy
decisions involved without seriously ham-
pering area inspections, and in this sense
would have to be a "rubber stamp." 4'
Further problems are created by this
procedure. If an inspector must get a
warrant after every refusal, he may be
tempted to by-pass such premises rather
than go through additional steps. This
would not only weaken the effectiveness
of investigations, but would tend to en-
courage more refusals as the news of the
search in question spreads throughout the
neighborhood. If he does obtain a war-
rant, he may feel no compulsion to post-
pone his inspection for a convenient
time, ' as he was in the habit of doing in
the past.4' There is also danger in the
possibility of police officials working to-
gether with health officials under the
"inspection" warrant to obtain evidence
in a criminal proceeding.4 4 Hopefully, the
courts will stop any such attempts.' 5
Since it is likely that refusals will in-
crease due to these decisions, the "indi-
vidual warrant" procedure could become
extremely burdensome and the inspector
41 For example, if probable cause were estab-
lished by the passage of a certain period of
time, the magistrate would not be free to de-
cide whether or not this was a reasonable length
of time.
42 Comment, Administrative Inspections and the
Fourth Amendmnent-A Rationale, 65 COLUM.
L. REv. 288, 292 (1965).
44Id. at 292 n.28.
44 Schwartz, Crucial Areas in Administrative
Law, 34 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 401, 424 (1966).
4. But cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217
(1960).
may procure a warrant for the entire
area to be presented to any reluctant
occupant within its scope. While this
method will save the inspector a great
deal of time and effort and insure a
more thorough investigation, it is an
open question whether these "area war-
rants" fulfill the fourth amendment re-
quirement that the place of the search be
particularly described. The Court may well
decide that the "place of the search" can
be expanded, just as "probable cause"
was, to permit area searches. Indeed,
since "probable cause" can be based, not
only on the particular premises involved,
but on the entire area, such area war-
rants would seem to afford no less pro-
tection than the "individual warrants."
At first glance, it appears that the
Court has given the individual a greater
right of privacy by requiring search war-
rants and, at the same time, taken away
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that right with its broad interpretation
of "probable cause." To allow the usual
standards of "probable cause" to prevail,
however, would have destroyed the ef-
ficacy of the area inspection, which is
the most effective way to discover all vio-
lations.4 6 What these decisions do is ful-
fill two basic needs for the protection of
the individual: (1) the requirement that
he be informed of the authority for the
search as well as its purpose and limits
before a criminal prosecution is risked
by refusing entry, and (2) the need to be
free of the unbridled discretion of the
officer in the field. This is a good deal
more than was previously available and
to have gone further would have been too
great a sacrifice of the public need.
4, Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing
Codes, 78 HARv. L. REV. 801, 807 (1965).
A POLITICIAN'S CONSCIENCE
(Continued)
will be right. But compromise reached
by a careful weighing of equities is not
harmful to the domestic structure. Com-
promise and consensus are what democ-
racy thrives on. Only when a nation
finds itself split on powerful competing
principles that will not admit of com-
promise will it be in serious trouble.
The United States in 1860 and Spain
in 1936 are cases in point. In each case,
the opponents rushed to battle with
slogans of principles on their lips, each
finding that the ensuing years demanded
many of the same compromises that might
have headed off the conflict in the first
place.
Essentially, the responsible politician is
one willing to examine the opposition's
points carefully. He is one willing to
judge ideas by their content rather than
by their source. He will be, in short,
a man whose good conscience will de-
mand that he always seek justice by the
light of many principles-and not by the
beam of one isolated ideal.
